Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe European Union (EU) has developed three institutions to facilitate intelligence‐sharing between its Member States: the Berne Group, Europol and the European Union Military Staff. These institutions serve the useful function of creating technical mechanisms for the diffusion of intelligence among national authorities. But they do not tackle the problem of mistrust, which is the key barrier to fully effective intelligence‐sharing. This article shows that mistrust of the interests of other Member States inhibits intelligence‐sharing, that existing institutions fail to overcome this mistrust and suggests changes that could lead to more effective sharing.

This essay examines whether the European Union, already the most powerful economic & financial rival of the United States, can develop its military arm to a level compatible with its economic & financial weight. It concludes by suggesting a parallel between European currency & the European military. The ECU started as virtual money that evolved into the Euro to become a real danger for the U.S. dollar. At this point, the nascent EU army is only a potential threat to a still unchallenged U.S. military power, but a parallel & ominous evolution is under way. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

As Director-General of the European Military Staff (EUMS), British Army Lieutenant General David Leakey oversees early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning for the EU and from December 2004 to December 2005 commanded the first EU Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, experiencing first-hand the Berlin Plus arrangements in practice. In this interview, General Leakey touches on civil-military cooperation, EU combat readiness, and the lessons learned from operations in the Congo, shares his experiences as the first EUFOR commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and discusses potential future operational cooperation with NATO. Figures. Adapted from the source document.

Events in 2001 served as a mid-course test for the pursuit of the European Security & Defence Policy (ESDP). The post-11 September developments brought home to the EU the reality of its role & potential in the transatlantic relationship. In 2001 the ESDP was declared operational, but the issue of EU access to NATO's assets remained unresolved. The question of duplication of efforts by the EU & NATO has also not been sufficiently addressed. Defining the ESDP & building public support for increased spending will pose a challenge in the coming years. Adapted from the source document.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall & the nature of international conflict has changed. At the same time, the Canadian Forces & the Department of National Defense have seen dramatic reductions in their budgets & personnel strength, with an increase in operational tempo amid missions in the former Yugoslavia, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Haiti & other areas. Concurrently, the European Union, as a grouping of twenty-five Member States, has begun to coordinate their foreign & defense policy, establishing a Security Strategy, a Defense Agency, & a Rapid Reaction Force. In the academic literature, the Canada- EU military relationship, specifically in the area of procurement, tends to be overlooked, but is important in understanding the wider context of transatlantic security, defense & foreign policy. This paper will explore the procurement of major capital equipment, specifically aircraft, naval ships & mobile ground equipment & the factors influencing those decisions, including bilateral relationships between Canada & the United States & the European Union (EU). This paper will argue that Canada's procurement decisions are based on domestic & economic considerations combined with our increasing interdependence with the United States in both the economic & military fields, which is making it difficult to cooperate with the European Union in the area of procurement & defense related research & development. Adapted from the source document.